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ments in a natural way the unhistoric empiricism of an earlier date or of the present day. It would seem, however, that the problem of mental development is yet to be solved by a still more skilful reconciliation of idealism and empiricism, in which more room will be left for a definite character or pre-formation of mental elements at the very origin of development.

The reasons given for considering the axioms to be expressions of will do not seem to be conclusive. The precise meanings which we are to attach to the terms will and impulse, as well as feeling, are nowhere explained. There does not seem any sufficient reason, from the empirical point of view, for refusing to regard axioms and principles in the light of hypotheses—or what corresponds to hypotheses in the animal mind. Looking at the matter in this way, we might find the animal through the play of association coming to expect certain modes of happening in the world; now this expectation put in another form becomes a hypothesis or principle in regard to the constitution of the world. Unquestionably the practical needs and desires of life would act as impelling forces, but the primary character of the principle would remain not volitional but intellectual. If all thought is the product of will, as Dr. Schultz says, then so, of course, are the axioms. But I find no adequate proof given of this broad and somewhat bold proposition.

W. G. SMITH.

Democracy and Empire. With Studies of their Psychological, Economic, and Moral Foundations. By FRANKLIN HENRY GIDDINGS, M.A., Ph.D., Professor in Columbia University, New York. Author of "The Principles of Sociology." New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1900.—pp. x, 363.

This book, of course, is not primarily a contribution to theoretical philosophy. The larger part of its contents falls rather within the provinces of sociology, economics, and political science. A first glance at the table of contents would lead a reviewer, writing for a philosophical journal, to expect grist for his mill only in two or three places. Such titles as "The Democratic Empire," "Industrial Democracy," "The Trusts and the Public," "The Railroads and the State," and "The Consent of the Governed," promise wide room for discussion in almost any other periodical than this REVIEW. And yet a careful reading of the whole volume leads one to see that underlying the treatment of all the special topics there is a philosophical

principle, consistently carried out. That principle is no new one. It is as old as Plato and Aristotle, and as good as it is old. Professor Giddings states it in many ways, perhaps most succinctly when he says: "Integration and differentiation may, and normally do, proceed together" (p. 352).

In the first essay, "The Democratic Empire," Professor Giddings applies this principle by making such an empire consist in the federation of ethically like-minded communities, each of which, "homogeneous in nearly every respect—in blood, in traditions, in beliefs, in interests—may successfully conduct a local or municipal government of highly diversified functions." "An imperial government must be yet more general, if it is not to suppress freedom and the democratic spirit. It must confine itself practically to three things: namely, the imperial defence, the suppression of conflict between one part of the empire and another, and insistence that local administration shall come up to a certain standard in its protection of life and property, and in its respect for enlightenment. Doing these things and only these, it can leave each component part of the empire to evolve its own law and its own administration in its own way—to become, in short, as democratic as the spirit and the experience of the people will permit" (p. 11). In such an organization, the heterogeneity is that of the different kinships, customs, traditions, and religious faiths found in the different communities. The homogeneity is that of ethical like-mindedness, consisting "in a common loyalty to the common judgment and will, in a common willingness to share a common destiny, and in a common conviction of the priceless value of individual, religious, and local liberty. Given mental and moral agreement in these particulars, and a nation of any territorial extent, of any admixture of blood, of interests, of religions, can wax strong generation by generation, while yet becoming more free and more diversified in its social organization" (pp. 10–11). Such an empire "trusts to the spontaneous intercourse of men in the pursuit of their daily vocations to bring about a further assimilation which ultimately will perfect the human race in the spirit of brotherhood, under the single law of liberty." And such an empire, too, "England has already brought to a wonderful perfection," and "the United States is destined to create" (p. 12). To the question whether it is democratic to extend such an imperial government over communities which do not consent to being included under its sway, Professor Giddings makes answer by raising a further question: What is the true meaning of the maxim that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the gov-

erned? "As a statement of alleged political fact, it has singularly little content of truth. In human history governments have not often derived any powers, just or unjust, from any conscious, rational consent of the governed" (p. 259). "Over and over again, in our own history, the powers of state and national governments have been coercively applied to compel the submission of men who believed that they had as good right to rebel against the existing governmental authority—because they had never given, or were unwilling to continue, their consent to it—as had the men of the thirteen colonies who threw off the British yoke" (p. 263). If, therefore, by the consent of the governed is meant consent *at the moment when they submit to authority*, either our government has been unjust throughout the whole course of its history, or the maxim is false. But in the government exercised by parents over children, "the ethical justice of government has its source, not in the consent of subjects who at the moment are unfit to understand or to appreciate it; but only in that approval which may be given or withheld after full experience of the nature, objects, and excellence of government, and after the attainment of full maturity of reason to understand and to interpret it. In like manner, if a barbarian people is compelled to accept the authority of a state more advanced in civilization, the test of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of this imposition of authority is to be found not at all in any assent or resistance at the moment when the government begins, but only *in the degree of probability* that, after full experience of what the government can do to raise the subject population to a higher plane of life, *a free and rational consent will be given* by those who have come to understand all that has been done" (p. 265).

The paper on "Imperialism" goes more fully into the economic and political advantages and dangers of such government, and ends with the prophecy that if we do not go hand in hand with Great Britain in extending to the uncivilized peoples of the world "an English civilization, with its principles of freedom, self-government, and opportunity for all," the Russian-Chinese combination will force upon them "its policy of exclusiveness and its tradition of irresponsible authority" (p. 289). "It is for the people of the United States to say" (p. 290). The verdict of the United States will presumably not be determined chiefly by deliberate judgment on the part of its citizens, for "a political majority of the voters of a large country, with diversified resources and occupations and a heterogeneous population, will be governed mainly by a conservative instinct and will be modified only very slowly by opinion. It will carefully respect

the fundamental prejudices of 'slow' people" (p. 192). But there are agencies counteracting the conservatism of all huge masses. One means of progress is "the unifying and stimulating influence of war" (p. 193). Our recent war with Spain, however, was not so much a cause of any transformation of our ideals as the result of the national character. "There existed that peculiar combination of the moral forces of sympathy and conviction with the inherited love of dangerous enterprise, which, as I have attempted to show, must exist before the American people will go to war, but which is practically certain, when it does exist, to beget war" (p. 279). "If these hypotheses are sound, it follows that our wise men should discontinue their idle contention against cosmic law—in the realms of mind and of history —and should address themselves to the practical question: How can the American people best adapt themselves to their new responsibilities?" (p. 270). Thus much space has been given in this REVIEW to these political views, because they show how proper philosophical principles can be applied to practical problems. This, of course, does not mean that principles, got from nobody knows where, can be forced on the facts of this very workaday world of now and here. It simply means that the world of facts is a world of correlated facts, of facts in a system; and that a careful study of the principles of correlation and of system is not necessarily abstract. Abstract in one sense it must be, but so must every other study be abstract in the same sense; that is, it must concentrate attention upon some one problem and for the nonce neglect other things. But this neglect need be only temporary. It is not an ignoring but a postponing of other interests. Now this science of the principles of relation is worth anything only when the relations studied are real relations; that is, relations actually obtaining in the world of experience. In this sense, the study is concrete and may be of great practical value, especially in the problems of social organization.

There are other essays in Professor Giddings's book that deal more directly with philosophical problems, notably the second, the third, and the fourth papers, "The Ethical Motive," "The Psychology of Society," and "The Mind of the Many." In this last paper, the author dwells upon a theme that he has already made familiar in his previous books, and detailed criticism here is unnecessary. The theme is that the essential and all-comprehensive social fact is like-mindedness. A society exists only when among the members composing it there is a "consciousness of kind." Society is "any number of like-minded individuals, who know and enjoy their like-mindedness,

and are therefore able to work together for common ends" (p. 51). In the chapter entitled "The Psychology of Society," criticisms are made upon Professor Baldwin's conceptions that "the matter of social organizations consists of thoughts; by which is meant all sorts of intellectual states, such as imaginations, knowledges, and informations," and that the form or method of social organization consists "in the interaction of the individual as a particularizing force and society as a generalizing force." Professor Giddings maintains that "the substance of society at first is sympathy and instinct mainly. At its best estate, society may rise to a level where thought has for the moment completely subordinated feeling. But usually, and throughout the greater part of its career, society is sympathy and instinct more or less organized, more or less directed, more or less controlled, by thought" (p. 39). Against Professor Baldwin's view of the method of social organization, the author urges that the thought of self is not so largely a product of the social relation as Professor Baldwin represents. "The sociologist, then, must continue to think of the individual as being both an ego and a socius, and yet as being at all times more ego than socius" (pp. 33–34). "It seems probable, then, that in 'the dialectic of personal growth,' the original ego with which the dialectic starts, plays throughout a controlling part; and that, after all, the process of developing a socius is one which essentially consists in modifying, by means of social relations and activities, an originally independent self" (p. 34). And this development of the socius is accomplished by the mediation of a perception of resemblance working upon the material of social sympathy.

In the paper on "The Ethical Motive," the distinction between the ethical and the economic motive is discussed, and the result obtained is stated as follows: "In more technical terms, then, the economic motive is the sum of those normal desires to which, at any given moment, we are giving a preferential attention. The ethical motive is the sum of those normal desires which, at the same given moment, we are denying attention or forcing out of consciousness by neglect, but which will presently assert themselves strongly enough to divert attention" (p. 20). Whether the economist would accept such a statement of the economic motive I shall leave to the economist to say. At any rate, the ethical motive cannot be the sum of those normal desires to which we are denying attention. The only reason I shall give for such point-blank rejection of Professor Giddings's definition is the first reason Professor Giddings gives in confirmation of his definition, namely, the possible merging of the eco-

nomic into the ethical motive "when economy broadens out into a provision for the expansion and the future development of life" (pp. 20–21). If "the moral motive is one that makes for largeness of conscious life" (p. 17), and if a man may act "for largeness of conscious life," then surely he is giving preferential attention to the moral motive; and yet, in accordance with the definition given, the moral motive in such a case must be the desires which are forced out of consciousness, and which will presently reassert themselves; for instance, perhaps, the desire for sensual enjoyment at present neglected in deference to larger interests now consulted. Professor Giddings's definition would necessitate the conclusion that no man could consciously act from what at the time would be the ethical motive. Strangely enough, the inclusion of future interests in the ethical motive leads to the exclusion of present attention to these future interests. The ethical motive, even upon Professor Giddings's own showing, can be no less than regard for the *whole* interest of the agent, including his future life with all its possibilities of improvement, but *not excluding* the present desires that clamorously assert themselves. There are other points of interest in this discussion of the ethical motive, for example, the proposed reconciliation of utilitarian ethics with the ethics of duty; but the limits of this review forbid further comment. The typography of the book is unusually good, only one error having come to the reviewer's notice. On page 264, line 4 from bottom, 'its' should read 'their.' The book is one to be strongly commended both for the sanity of its thought and the clearness of its expression.

EVANDER BRADLEY MCGILVARY.

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The Moral Order of the World in Ancient and Modern Thought. By ALEXANDER BALMAIN BRUCE, D.D. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899.—pp. viii, 431.

This volume is composed of the Gifford Lectures for 1898, and is the second series by the same author, the previous series on the *Providential Order* having been already published. The lectures before us are mainly historical and critical, dealing with what the leading moralists of the past have thought about the moral order of the world, and with the author's estimate of the value of their teachings. "We see," says Mr. Bruce, "that the sages of various lands, in far-past ages, unite in the emphatic assertion of a Moral Order as the thing of supreme moment for the faith and life of man." "The root of this basal faith is an intense moral consciousness. Men believe in a